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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of the global financial crisis on cross-border long-term security 
flows from and towards the U.S. We are investigating monthly observations from 72 countries 
over the period from 2003 to 2013. The findings show that the global financial crisis impacted all 
cross-border capital flows in our analysis; yet, the timing, the significance, and the nature of the 
impact varies among the different securities, as well as between a sample of developed and 
emerging market countries. We find evidence for a flight-to-safety with the start of the global 
financial crisis, with a significant, but short lived interruption due to the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. Further, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers has caused an abrupt drop in holdings of 
U.S. and foreign equity, which have not recovered ever since. This may suggest that the 
extraordinary event has caused a general increase in international investors’ risk aversion. 
Finally, our results do not provide much evidence for the claim made by developing countries’ 
policymakers that the accommodative monetary policies by the U.S. have caused an overall 
disruptive capital flow towards their economies. 
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2. Introduction 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 led to the worst recession 
in the U.S. in over 80 years and almost brought down the global financial system. While 
the crisis originated with the default U.S. mortgage-backed securities and the collapse of 
the U.S subprime mortgage market, it quickly spread through the U.S. banking system 
and, almost overnight, tumbled the U.S. economy and caused a global recession. The 
government of several world economies, especially the U.S., intervened immediately 
with extraordinary bailout packages of the banking industry, which was followed by 
unprecedented accommodating monetary policies. Besides the impact on the world 
economy there is ample evidence the global financial crisis had a significant impact on 
global capital flows, both in developed and developing countries (e.g., Forbes and 
Warnock, 2012; Bluedorn et al., 2013; Broner et al., 2013; and Ahmed and Zlate, 2013). 
As pointed out by Beraut et al. (2009) cross-border capital flows provide important 
information about foreign investors’ optimism towards domestic assets. Moreover, they 
are essential for countries that are running a current account deficit. However, most 
studies investigate the gross inflow or net inflow of countries’ aggregate annual capital 
flows
1
; nonetheless, certain financial securities may have experience different impacts at 
different times. 
In this paper, we investigate if the trade volume of 72 countries (measured in U.S. 
dollars) of foreign purchase of U.S. long-term securities, as well as the U.S. purchase of 
foreign securities over the period from 2003 to 2013. The study differs from others in the 
following ways: First, we use monthly frequency taken from the web-page of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury
2
, which allows for a more precise determination of when and 
how the events of the financial crisis may have impacted the cross-border capital flows. 
Second, the employed dataset permits for an investigation of U.S. treasury securities, 
U.S. government bonds, U.S. corporate bonds, U.S. corporate stocks, foreign bonds and 
foreign stocks separately, instead of just the aggregate. Third, we investigate the cross-
                                                          
1
 Gross capital flows are the net sales of domestic securities to foreign residents (inflows) or the 
net purchase of foreign securities by domestic residents (outflow). Net capital flows are the 
difference between the gross inflows and outflows. 
2
 The data is available under the following web-page: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/country-longterm.aspx. 
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border capital flows and their volatility for three periods: 1) the pre-crisis period from 
2003 to 2006, 2) the global financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009, and 3) the post-
crisis period from 2010 to 2013. Fourth, besides investigating the aggregate cross-border 
capital flows, we also examine if there have been differences between U.S. cross-border 
security flows from and towards developed and developing countries by splitting our 
sample into a sample of 24 developed and 48 developing countries. This is of special 
interest as several emerging market policymakers have claimed that the accommodative 
monetary policies by developing countries have triggered disruptive capital inflow to 
their financial markets causing an asset pricing bubble, currency appreciation, and 
ultimately a threat to their export-led growth strategy. However, there are other channels 
through which the financial crisis may have impacted cross-border security flows. That is 
to say, the safe-haven effect, according to which capital may have flown away from 
riskier markets towards safer and more liquid ones, or an overall reduction in holdings of 
foreign securities due to a general increase in investors’ risk aversion. This also raises the 
question if certain long-term securities are impacted differently. We control for possible 
“financial center bias” by excluding the U.K. and the Cayman Islands from our samples. 
In most cases this did not change our results. 
 
3. Literature Review 
The recent Global Financial Crisis has been declared as the worst financial crisis 
since the great depression in the 30s to many. Although the crisis itself began in only a 
portion of the United States’ financial market, i.e. the mortgage market, most major 
financial institutions and banks were ultimately impacted. Institutions and investors 
heavily invested in the prosperous real estate market, which was filled with subprime 
mortgages through mortgage-backed-securities. The collapse of the subprime mortgage 
market caused significant losses to the institutions that heavily traded securities, such as 
collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps. Due to the uncertainty who 
would default next, banks were reluctant to lend money to other financial institutions. 
This led to a credit crunch (Page, 2013) and a contagion of the financial crisis through the 
U.S. and ultimately the world economy. The result of the loss of credit was the collapse 
of large institutions (Martinez and Williams, 2012). The most influential downfall of a 
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financial institution was the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008. Holyst et al. (2011) 
states …“the Lehman Brothers default event is quantified as having an almost immediate 
effect in worsening the credit worthiness of all financial institutions in the economic 
network”. This claim supports how, soon after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
international banking and finance sectors began to default, and the financial crisis was 
almost immediately exacerbated (Broner et al., 2013).  Due to the large globalization of 
our financial markets, the bankruptcy of this investment bank sent a shockwave 
throughout every country and financial institution (Alcorta and Nixson, 2011).  
As investors sought out safety for their investments, the international financial 
markets declined. International capital flows, i.e. money movement among borders 
through investing, trading, or practicing business, began to slow and decrease to 
disparaging low numbers. Hence, the beginning of the financial crisis marked a large 
overall decrease in capital flows. Broner et al. (2013) states that inflows through foreign 
investors and outflows through domestic investors decreased throughout every country 
during a crisis; this movement, in turn, creates a decrease in the overall amount of capital 
flows. They elaborate further and argue that capital inflows and outflows are extremely 
volatile and procyclical; therefore, they decline during times of crisis and expand in times 
of prosperity. Forbes and Warnock (2012) agree with Broner et al. (2013) in that the 
global market is extremely volatile. This volatility in the global market is influenced by a 
myriad of factors. These factors include global risk, contagion of markets, and the rate of 
global growth (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). Because of the broad range of factors that 
determine the changes in the global market, policymakers are not able to completely alter 
and change the market structure in a short period of time. Consequently, after such a 
large scale global financial catastrophe, there are very few globally effective options for 
governments to take in order to reinstate their previously successful markets without 
affecting a multitude of other markets.  
The global financial crisis took such a toll on the developed countries’ markets 
that they were willing to take extreme measures to rebuild the economy. Advanced 
markets implemented accommodative monetary policies to intervene and to assist the 
restructuring of their floundering economies. Their solution was to utilize credit easing or 
quantitative easing (QE) policies. These policies were constructed in countries with large 
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scale centralized banks, such as England, Japan, and the United States (Powell, 2013). 
The QE policy established by the United States was implemented after the bankruptcy of 
the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. By executing quantitative easing during the 
latter half of the financial crisis, the United States aimed to improve and stimulate their 
economy through the repair of financial markets by focusing mainly on liquidity 
operations and, also, the large scale asset purchases (LSAP) of debt, mortgage backed 
securities, and treasury securities (Fratszcher et al., 2013). Large scale asset purchases 
were one of the most influential factors of the United States QE because of their 
influence on long-term interest rates. By integrating LSAP into an economy, the long-
term interest rates were lowered, in addition to the already near zero short-term interest 
rates, resulting in increasing asset prices and in a decline of the value of the U.S. dollar 
(Powell, 2013; Fratzscher et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2011).  Additionally, the literature 
suggests that the initial effects of the financial crisis was a rise in global risk aversion 
(Bertraut and Pounder, 2009; Bluedorn et al., 2013), causing an increase in the demand 
for U.S. Treasury securities (Bertraut and Pounder, 2009). Moreover, Bluedorn et al. 
(2013) suggest that the risk aversion caused a net inflow towards advanced economies, 
and, in turn, supports the theory that emerging markets were perceived as more risky. 
This is an example of the safe haven or flight to safety effect; where, despite the low 
returns, investors required government backed securities to insure their investments and 
their returns. 
However, as the low yields persisted and risk aversion deteriorated, some 
investors began to look for higher returns and higher risk investments. The low interest 
rates in the United States in combination with the unprecedented monetary seem to have 
caused flows of capital into emerging markets (Ghosh et al., 2012). Thus, the QE policies 
affected more than just the United States and other developed countries. These 
quantitative policies that were established to help solely stimulate developed markets 
began to affect and stimulate the market on a global scale. Powell agrees that the global 
market was, in fact, supported and boosted due to the QE policies (2013). Following the 
crisis, Powell’s claims seem to be reinforced as the QE policies seemed to have stabilized 
the global financial market and the monetary easing policies greatly influenced a plethora 
of assets in all markets (Chen et al., 2011). But, in the long run, the accommodative 
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monetary policies created a spillover effect that seemed to largely alter and negatively 
influence developing economies. Because of the small scale of a developing country’s 
market, the large influx of capital seemed to almost stretch their already fragile 
economies to their breaking point.  Many emerging market policymakers claimed that 
they experienced enormous price inflation, escalating capital inflows, and extreme credit 
growth (Chen et al., 2011). Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) assert that large capital inflow 
periods in lower income countries (i.e., emerging markets) go hand in hand with inflation 
crises in the aforementioned countries. Because of increasing inflation throughout their 
economies, exchange rates were negatively impacted, and their export growth strategies 
were severely damaged. Because of the lesser state of a developing country’s economy, 
they are more heavily affected by large changes in the market than a developed country 
(Fratzscher et al., 2013). Also, most literature seems to infer that capital flows in 
emerging markets are much more volatile than those in advanced economies, which 
support the theory that the developing markets were largely affected by accommodative 
monetary policies whether it be positive or negative (Bluedorn, et al., 2013).  
Nonetheless, although the developing markets appear to be influenced negatively 
solely by the accommodative monetary policies put in place by developed countries, the 
developed countries may not be the sole perpetrators. Every emerging market seemed to 
be affected by the unconventional policies in a synchronous manner. However, each 
emerging economy may have been affected uniquely. There is no uniformity in the 
negative experiences between each country, which suggests that other factors played 
roles in the rapid growth and decline of emerging markets (Chen et al., 2011; Ghosh et 
al., 2012). Research indicates that common risk, liquidity, yield factors, and asset returns 
played larger roles than quantitative easing in the surge of capital to developing countries 
(Fratzscher et al., 2013). Rate differentials and growth differentials were also declared as 
“statistically significant” to the large inflows of capital to emerging markets (Ahmed and 
Zlate, 2013). In this case, it seems as if risk was the overlying determinant for cross-
border capital flows throughout the global financial crisis. Whether it was a “flight to 
safety” or a tsunami of flows towards emerging markets, risk is the recurring factor that 
seemed to determine the course of securities. 
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Although there is a plethora of research and papers about the impact on capital 
flows throughout the span of the financial crisis, our aim is to elaborate and delve deeper 
into the previously completed studies. Most scholarly articles, e.g. Bluedorn et al. (2013), 
Forbes and Warnock (2012), and Chen et al. (2011), finish analyzing capital flows in 
2010 or 2011; while we have extended the data collection to include 2013. Also, we 
analyzed the data monthly rather than annually or quarterly and take a look at specific 
types of securities instead of aggregate capital flows, which may allow for a more precise 
understanding of cross-border capital flows. Moreover, we split our sample into countries 
from developed and developing economies.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
The data utilized in this study comes from the Treasury International Capital 
(TIC) reporting system, which is available on the web-page from the U.S. Department of 
Treasury.
3
 The dataset provides a comprehensive accumulation of the monthly 
transactions of different long-term securities from and towards 77 foreign countries, 
starting in 1977. The data include the gross purchase and the gross sales of U.S. treasury 
bonds and notes, U.S. government agency bonds, U.S. corporate bonds, U.S. corporate 
stocks, foreign bonds and foreign stocks. Note the data does not distinguish between 
foreign government and corporate bonds. We focus in our analysis on the U.S. treasuries, 
U.S. corporate bonds, as well as foreign stocks and bonds. We consider purchase and 
sale, as well as the net purchase of U.S. long-term securities by foreigners. The net 
purchase of U.S. securities by foreigners represents gross purchases by foreigners minus 
the gross sale by foreigners. Additionally, we consider the purchase and sale
4
, as well as 
the net purchase of foreign long-term securities by the U.S. The net purchase of foreign 
                                                          
3
 
3
 The data is available under the following web-page: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/country-longterm.aspx. 
 
4
 Note, the gross purchase of foreign long-term securities by U.S. residents is equivalent to the 
gross sales of foreign long-term securities to U.S. residents; while the gross sales of foreign long-
term securities by U.S. residents is equivalent to the gross purchase of foreign long-term 
securities from U.S. residents. 
8 
 
long-term securities by U.S. residents represents the gross sales by foreigners to U.S. 
residents minus the gross purchase by foreigners from U.S. residents.  
After gathering all of the data for each country, we separated our sample into 
countries from developed and developing markets. Instead of merely looking at gross 
domestic product or national income, we choose to look at the countries as investors 
would by utilizing equity indices. By combining two pre-existing, globally renowned 
equity indices, we formed a set standard of countries.  Standard and Poor (S&P) has an 
equity index with 25 developed countries, 21 emerging markets, and 12 frontier markets. 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) has an equity index with 23 developed 
markets, 24 emerging economies, and 57 frontier markets. By overlapping these indices 
with the TIC, we achieved our total of 72 countries. These countries included 48 
developing countries and 24 developed countries. The developing country portion also 
included seven frontier markets. Certain countries were omitted due to the absence of 
data in certain time periods or the general lack of data in the TIC.  Table 1, panel A 
shows that our sample covers between 96% and 99% of the grand total reported by the 
TIC. The only exception is U.S corporate stocks, for which our sample only covers 
between 90% to 96% of the TIC grand total. 
One needs to note that the subsample of developed and developing countries may 
be distorted by a potential transaction bias brought about by intermediary financial 
centers, as the recorded transactions for each individual country do not necessarily 
indicate the country from which the foreign securities were ultimately bought. For 
example, an investor from Spain might purchase a United States Treasury security 
through an intermediary in the United Kingdom. The Treasury security is then 
documented as being bought by the United Kingdom although it was purchased by 
someone in Spain (Bertaut and Pounder, 2009). This may lead to an overstating of 
transactions for financial centers and an understating for countries that use non-domestic 
financial centers. According to Bertaut and Judson (2014) the transaction bias may be 
especially problematic with respect to foreign bonds, but may be less problematic with 
respect to foreign securities bought by U.S. investors. The countries that exhibit the most 
influential effects of intermediaries include the United Kingdom and Cayman Islands. 
However, the Bahamas and Bermuda also constitute a much smaller portion of the large 
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Caribbean financial center (Bertaut and Pounder, 2009). To control for the impact of the 
transaction, we analyze the data for our sub-samples of developed and developing 
countries with and without the Cayman Islands in case of emerging markets and with and 
without the United Kingdom in the case developed markets. Table 2, panels B to E, 
shows the percentage of the transaction demand through and from the UK and the 
Cayman Islands in comparison to the values for our whole sample, as well as the sample 
of developed or developing countries. The table shows that UK (panel C) represents a 
higher transaction proportion of the entire sample than the Cayman Islands do (panel D). 
When we distinguish between developed (panel E), and developing countries (panel F), 
however, we can see the equal impact of the UK with respect to developed countries and 
the Cayman Islands with respect to developing countries. Interestingly, the transaction 
proportion of the UK with respect to developed countries has decreased during the 
financial crisis for all types of securities, except treasury securities. The transaction 
proportion for the Cayman Islands, on the other hand, did not change much during the 
period of the global financial crisis.   
We start with our sample in 2003 to exclude the impact of the crises in some of 
the emerging countries in the late 90s as well as the beginning of the last decade. 
Moreover, this also excludes the impact of the bursting tech bubble in 2000 as well as the 
terrorist attack on 9/11. We stop with our sample in 2013 to exclude more recent data that 
may be incorrect and may change as the TIC revises them and provides more accurate 
numbers. 
  
4.2 Methodology 
To investigate the impact of the financial crisis, we divide our entire period 
ranging from 2003 to 2013 into three sub-periods: 1) pre-crisis period from 2003 to 2006; 
2) crisis period from 2007 to 2009; and 3) the post-crisis period from 2010 to 2013. 
While the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers is generally considered as the height of the 
global financial crisis, there is usually a general consensus that the start of the global 
financial crisis can be dated back to 2007. We also include 2009 into the time of the crisis 
period as, according to IMF (2010, 2011) the output of the world decreased by 0.6 
percent and the output of advanced economies declined by 3.4%; however, starting in 
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2010 world output grew again. Moreover, 2010 to 2013 represents a period of 
unprecedented monetary policies by the Federal Reserve. This includes the quantitative 
easing two (QE2) and three (QE3); which may have significantly influenced international 
capital flows.   
We examine the impact of the global financial crisis by visually investigating the 
flow of cross-border long-term securities. This is done by first drawing line charts to 
depict the change in the purchase and sales of U.S. and foreign long-term securities. We 
do this for the entire sample of 72 countries, as well as the sample of 24 developed and 
48 developing countries. Additionally, we show the bar graphs of the net purchase of 
U.S. and foreign long-term securities. Further, we present the bar charts of the average 
total amount of purchased and net purchased U.S. and foreign long-term securities for the 
overall period from 2003 to 2013, as well as our three sub-periods. This allows us to see 
if there have been substantial changes during and after the financial crisis. Finally, we 
calculate the monthly averages and the standard deviations for each sample, period, and 
type of security. The standard deviations allow for an assessment of a change in volatility 
for the different securities over the three sub-periods. 
Finally, we conduct a two sample t-test with a Levene-Test of equal variance 
using SPSS to see if there are statistically significant differences between the three sub-
periods. The groups tested include: 1) the periods from 2007 to 2009 versus the periods 
2010 to 2013, 2) the periods from 2003 to 2006 versus the periods from 2007 to 2009, 
and 3) the periods from 2003 to 2006 versus 2010 to 2013. Hence, null hypothesis states 
that various periods have equal population means H0: (𝜇1 − 𝜇2) = 0. See also Keller 
(2014, page 440) for a discussion on the two sample t-test. 
The test statistics assuming equal variance becomes:  
𝑡 =
( 𝑥1 − 𝑥2 ) − ( 𝜇1 − 𝜇2)
√𝑠𝑝
2 (
1
𝑛1
+
1
𝑛2
)
 
where 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are the means of the two periods being tested, and  (𝜇1 − 𝜇2) is the 
difference between the population means. The variables 𝑛1 and 𝑛2 are the sizes of the 
samples and 𝑠𝑝
2 is the pooled variance estimator. 
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𝑠𝑝
2 =
(𝑛1 − 1)𝑠1
2 + (𝑛2 − 1)𝑠2
2
𝑛1 − 𝑛2 − 2
 
 The test statistics is a Student t-distribution n1 + n2 -2 degrees of freedom, 
assuming normal distribution of both populations. 
The test statistic assuming unequal variance becomes:  
𝑡 =
( 𝑥1 − 𝑥2 ) − ( 𝜇1 − 𝜇2)
√(
𝑠1
𝑛1
+
𝑠2
𝑛2
)
 
where 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are the standard deviations of the two samples. Yet, the sampling 
distribution of the resulting statistics is no longer normal or Student t-distributed. 
However, the Student t-distribution can be approximated using a more complicated 
calculation for the degrees of freedom.
5
 We test for equal variance using the Levene-Test 
in SPSS. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Monthly long-term securities bought and sold as well as net purchases  
Figures 1 to 4 show the monthly amount of long-term securities bought and sold by 
foreigners in U.S. dollar (line-chart) and the net purchases by foreigners (bar-charts). The 
long-term securities include U.S. treasuries (Figure 1), U.S. government bonds (Figure 
2), U.S. corporate bonds (Figure 3), and U.S. corporate stocks (Figure 4). We show the 
graphs for our entire sample (column 1), as well as our split sample of developed 
countries (column 2) and emerging countries (column 3). Panel A provides the graphs of 
all countries, including the Cayman Islands and the UK, and panel B shows the graphs 
excluding the Cayman Islands and the UK; hence, controlling somewhat for the 
“financial center bias”, which makes the identification of the foreign counterparties 
difficult. Figures 5 to 6 show the monthly amount of bought and sold foreign stocks and 
foreign bonds, respectively, as well as the amount of net purchases. We refer to the 
overall trade volume of securities when discussing the purchase and sales of securities.  
 
5.1.1 Monthly purchases and net purchases of U.S. long-term securities by foreigners  
                                                          
5
 See Keller (2014, page 440) for the calculation of the degrees of freedom in the case of unequal 
variance.  
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Treasuries and Government Bonds 
Figures 1 and 2 (panel A, column 1) show a substantial increase in trade volume 
of U.S. treasuries and U.S. government bonds for the two years preceding the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers (indicated by the vertical line). Considering that the active phase of 
the crisis is commonly dated back to the beginning of 2007, the finding supports the 
general notion that the early period of the financial crisis has seen a flight-to-safety.
6
 
Interestingly, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 caused a 
significant but rather short-lived drop in the trade volume of U.S. treasuries. This may be 
related to an overall reduction in holdings of foreign securities due to a general increase 
in international investors’ risk aversion, brought about by the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. Notably, the drop in trade volume of U.S. government bonds occurred already 
in early 2008.  The demand for U.S. treasuries, however, resumed again in mid-2009 and 
reached its peak in mid-2011. The increase in overall trade volume of U.S. treasury 
securities was accompanied by an increase in net purchases of U.S. treasuries beginning 
2009; while the trade volume and the net purchases of U.S. government bond has stayed 
below crisis levels ever since. Hence, the flight to safety seemed to be interrupted by the 
extraordinary event of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, but continued and even intensified 
after investors absorbed the initial shock. The patterns for developed countries (column 
2) are very similar to those based on the overall sample and do not change much when we 
exclude the UK (panel B). With respect to our sample of emerging countries (column 3), 
we find slightly different patterns, especially if we exclude the Cayman Islands. It 
appears that it took investors from emerging countries, in comparison to those from 
developed countries, much longer to regain trust in U.S. treasury securities. Moreover, 
the rebound in the trade volume of U.S. treasury securities is less pronounced for 
emerging countries once we exclude the Cayman Islands. Finally, there seems to be a 
general increase in the demand for U.S. treasuries and U.S. government bonds with the 
start of 2013. 
Corporate Bonds 
                                                          
6
 Bertaut and Pounder (2009) show that the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 coincides 
with a flight-to-safety, as foreign investors increased their demand for U.S. treasury securities, 
while moving out of other more risky securities. 
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 Looking at the graphs for U.S. corporate bonds (Figure 3), we find that they 
experienced high demand up to the start of the financial crisis in 2007, which in part may 
be related to the increase in new issued corporate asset-backed securities, as well as the 
international demand for such securities. Yet, we see a significant drop in trade volume 
and net purchases with the beginning of 2008. Thus, while the demand for U.S. treasuries 
decreased substantially with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the decline in demand 
for U.S. corporate bonds happened much earlier. Interestingly, the first half of 2009 saw 
again an increase in trade volume for U.S. corporate bonds, followed by continuing 
decrease in the demand for U.S. corporate bonds to levels below the ones preceding the 
global financial crisis. Two factors may have caused the decrease in demand for U.S. 
corporate debt during and after the global financial crisis. First, as stated by Bertaut and 
Pounder (2009), U.S. corporate issuance decreased in 2008, while the sales of U.S. debt 
was still high due to the redemption of maturing securities, which led to the negative net 
purchases. Second, the flight-to-safety as investors moved out of the more risky U.S. 
corporate bonds and bought U.S. treasury securities. The latter argument is supported by 
the fact that the low levels of trade volume of U.S. corporate bonds, as well their net 
purchases, have not recuperated after the global financial crisis, while the demand for 
U.S. treasuries has increased during the same time frame. Further, the pattern remains 
fairly robust if we distinguish between developed (column 2) and emerging countries 
(column 3) and/or exclude the UK or the Cayman Islands (panel B). 
 
 
Corporate Stocks 
 Similar to U.S. corporate bonds, we find for U.S. equity securities (Figure 4) a 
considerable increase in trade volume before the financial crisis. However, while the 
trade volume for corporate bonds decreased with the start of the financial crisis in 2007, 
the trade volume for U.S. equity securities remained at high levels until Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008. With the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
however, the trade volume dropped substantially and has not recovered ever since. This is 
especially interesting given that the Dow Jones index more than doubled its value from 
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2009 to 2013.
7
 The finding holds for developed countries (column 2) and emerging 
countries (column 3) alike. Moreover, the finding does not change if we exclude the UK 
and the Cayman Islands. With respect to the net purchases of U.S. equity securities, we 
find similar patterns; yet, the reduction seemed to have started already during the 
financial crisis. Moreover, the financial crisis, as well as the period starting mid-2011, 
has seen large swings between positive and negative net purchases, especially when we 
are excluding the UK and the Cayman Islands. In general, the findings suggest that the 
financial crisis has caused a general reduction of foreign investors’ appetite for U.S. 
corporate bonds and stocks, plausibly brought about by a general higher level of risk 
aversion. 
 
5.1.2 Monthly purchases and net purchases of foreign long-term securities by the U.S. 
Foreign Stocks 
Figure 6 shows the graphs for the purchases of foreign stocks by the U.S. The 
patterns are very much comparable to those found for U.S. equity securities. That is to 
say, an increase in trade volume before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and an 
immediate drop in the last quarter of 2008, which was followed by a general lower 
demand.  Again, the finding is mainly robust with respect to our sample of developed 
countries (column 2) and emerging countries (column 3), and does not change if we 
exclude the Cayman Islands and the UK. It suggests that the global financial crisis has 
caused a general reduction in cross-border equity positions, which has impacted U.S. 
equity and foreign equity alike. Moreover, with respect to foreign equity bought by U.S. 
investors, we do not find evidence that the accommodative monetary policies of the U.S. 
have caused a considerable increase in capital inflow towards emerging countries. 
Foreign Bonds 
Looking at foreign bonds, Figure 5 reveals for the period prior to the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, as well as its immediate aftermath, similar shapes as discussed for 
U.S. corporate bonds. The patterns are again very much the same for our whole sample 
(column 1), as well as the sample of developed countries (column 2) and emerging 
countries (column 3). All samples show a substantial decrease in trade volume and net 
                                                          
7
 The value increased from around 8,000 to over 16,500, a return of over 106%.  
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purchases during 2008. That finding does not change much when we exclude the UK and 
Cayman Islands. Interestingly, our sample of developed countries including the UK 
(panel A, column 2) shows a significant spike in trade volume in the first half of 2010; 
which disappears if we exclude the UK. During the period following the financial crisis, 
however, the patterns for foreign bonds follow more those of the U.S. treasuries than U.S. 
corporate bonds. The graphs show that trade volume of foreign bonds resumed from 2009 
to 2013. The finding is especially striking for emerging countries (column 3) for which 
we find a continuous increase in trade volume since the mid-2009, reaching levels of 
more than five times the levels seen before the crisis. Notably, the finding does not 
change if we exclude the Cayman Islands.  The general increase in foreign bonds may 
suggest that U.S. investors are using foreign bonds as a substitute for the more risky 
perceived foreign equity. Further, the findings may also be related to the accommodative 
monetary policies of the U.S., which has caused unprecedented low short-term and long-
term interest rates. This in turn seems to support the claims made by some policymakers 
from emerging countries that monetary policies of developed countries, particularly the 
U.S., have triggered disruptive capital flows into their economies. However, this 
amplified capital flows seem to be exclusively related to foreign bonds and not equity 
flows and maybe more related to U.S. investors seeking higher fixed income returns, 
rather than the increase in liquidity due to quantitative easing in the U.S.  
With respect to the net purchases of foreign bonds we find for the whole sample 
(column 1) and the sample of developed countries (column 2) mainly positive capital 
flows for the period immediately prior to the financial crisis as well as during the first 
half of the financial crisis. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brother triggered again substantial 
negative net purchases of foreign bonds. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, however, 
we see an increase in monthly negative net purchases of foreign bonds. With respect to 
the net purchases of foreign bonds from emerging countries (column 3), we find for the 
entire period from 2003 to 2013 monthly swings of positive and negative values; 
however, those swings have become larger after the financial crisis.   
Thus, while the global financial crisis has reduced the demand for foreign bonds 
in its immediate aftermath, the trade volume and the volatility of the net purchases has 
increased, especially for emerging countries. 
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5.2 Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis average monthly purchases and net purchases 
Figures 7 to 10 show the average monthly purchases and net purchases of U.S. treasuries 
(Figure 7), U.S. government bonds (Figure 8), U.S. corporate bonds (Figure 9), and U.S. 
corporate stocks (Figure 10) for the entire period from 2003 to 2013, the pre-crisis period 
from 2003 to 2006, the crisis period from 2007 to 2009, and the post-crisis period from 
2010 to 2013. Again, we show the graphs for our entire sample (column 1), as well as our 
split sample of developed countries (column 2) and emerging countries (column 3). 
Panels A and B provide the graphs for the average monthly purchases and net purchases 
of all countries, including the Cayman Islands and the UK. To control for the “financial 
center bias” panels C and panel D, show the graphs excluding the Cayman Islands and 
the UK. Figures 11 to 12 show the graphs of foreign stocks and foreign bonds bought by 
U.S. investors, respectively.  
Tables 2 to 7 provide the actual dollar amounts of the average monthly purchases 
and net purchases of the cross-border transactions with the U.S. for the entire period, as 
well as the three sub-periods. Additionally, the tables provide the standard deviations for 
the different periods, as well as the two-sample t-test, indicating if the change in the 
purchases of long-term securities from one period to the next is statistically significant. 
 
 5.2.1 Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis average monthly purchases and net purchases of 
U.S. long-term securities by foreigners 
U.S. Treasuries  
Figure 7 demonstrates that, compared to the pre-crisis period, the average 
monthly purchases (panel A, column 1) as well as the average monthly net purchases 
(panel B, column 1) of U.S. treasury securities increased during the financial crisis and 
continued to increase during the post-crisis period. The pattern does not change if focus 
on developed countries (column 2). Further, Table 2 shows that the increase is 
statistically significant for each period. While the pattern is also similar with respect to 
the net purchases for U.S. treasuries, they are not all statistically significant.   
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Excluding the UK from our sample of developed countries (panel D, column 2), 
we find a decrease in the net purchases during the crisis period. The decrease, however, is 
statistically insignificant (see Table 2).   
In line with our findings for the overall sample and the sample of developed 
countries, panel A (column 3) shows that the purchases of treasury securities increases 
for emerging countries over all three periods; and the increase is statistically significant 
(Table 2, panel A). However, the net purchases (panel B) decreases for the post-crisis 
period. Excluding the Cayman Islands from the sample of emerging market countries 
(panels C and D) shows an increase in the demand for U.S. treasury securities during the 
crisis period, but a decrease in the post-crisis period. Yet, none of the changes are 
statistically significant (Table 2, panel B). Finally, Table 2 shows a substantially higher 
volatility during the crisis-period and the post-crisis period. The finding holds with 
respect to the treasury securities bought and the net purchases, as well as our sample of 
developed and emerging countries. Splitting our sample into three sub-periods provides 
additional evidence for a flight-to-safety; however, the evidence seems to be especially 
striking for developed countries during the post-crisis period. 
U.S. Government Bonds 
Figure 8 (panel A, column 1) shows an increase in the overall purchases of U.S. 
government bonds during the crisis period and a drop in the post-crisis period to levels 
seen in the pre-crisis period. Both changes are statistically significant (see Table 3). The 
pattern is very similar if we split the sample in countries from developed markets 
(column 2) and emerging markets (column 3). Moreover, excluding the UK (panel C, 
column 2) does not change our results. However, excluding the Cayman Islands shows 
that there is an increase in the post-crisis period for emerging countries. Yet, the increase 
during the crisis period and the post-crisis period is insignificant (Table 3, panel B). 
Looking at the net purchases of U.S. government bonds (panel B) indicates a 
statistically significant decrease (Table 3, panel A) for all three samples during the crisis 
period. The net purchases, however, picked up during the post crisis period, especially if 
we exclude the UK and the Cayman Islands (panel D), though the increase is not 
statistically significant (Table 2, panel B). Interestingly, while the U.S. treasuries showed 
elevated volatility levels for the crisis period and post-crisis period in comparison to the 
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pre-crisis period, we find that for U.S. government bonds the volatility has increased only 
during the crisis period.  
Thus, in contrast to U.S. treasuries, we find that investors from developed 
countries have not increased their holdings of U.S. government bonds after the financial 
crisis, while there seems to be a tendency of increased demand for U.S. government 
bonds by emerging markets. 
U.S. Corporate bonds 
 Figure 9 (panel A) shows, similar to the findings with respect to U.S. government 
bonds, that the overall purchases of corporate bonds increased for the crisis period, but 
decreased during the post-crisis period. The patterns hold for the overall sample (column 
1), as well as our sample of developed countries (column 2) and emerging market 
countries (column 3).  
Focusing on the net purchases of corporate bonds (panel B), we find a significant 
reduction for the crisis period versus the pre-crisis period. This may be due to the 
substantial decline in corporate bonds bought by foreigners surrounding the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, as well as the reduction in corporate bond issues, while at the same 
time the amount of maturing corporate bonds sold by foreigners was comparatively high. 
Panel B shows for all three samples that the net purchases of U.S. corporate bonds 
declined even further during the post-crisis period.  
The findings do not change when we exclude the UK and the Cayman Islands 
(panels C and D). Moreover, Table 4 shows that the changes are all statistically 
significant, with the only exception being the increase in U.S. corporate bonds bought by 
developed countries (excluding the UK). The findings provide additional evidence that 
foreign investors have reduced their overall holdings of U.S. corporate bonds during the 
post-crisis period. Moreover, the levels in the post-crisis period are statistically 
significantly lower than those found in the pre-crisis period. Table 4 further demonstrates 
a substantial increase in volatility during the crisis period in comparison to the pre-crisis 
period; while the volatility in the post-crisis period has been lower in comparison to the 
pre-crisis period. 
Corporate stocks 
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Figure 10 (panels A and C) shows that the demand for U.S. corporate stocks 
bought by foreigners is similar to the pattern found for U.S. government bonds and 
corporate bonds. That is to say, a statistically significant increase during the crisis period 
and a statistically significant drop during the post-crisis period (see Table 5). The pattern 
stays the same for our sample of developed and emerging countries (columns 2 and 3) 
and does not change if we exclude the UK and Cayman Islands. In comparison to the 
findings for corporate bonds, however, the pattern does not change when we consider the 
net purchasse of U.S. stocks by foreigners. This suggests that the demand for U.S. stocks 
was relatively strong during the whole crisis period from 2007 to 2009 and dropped only 
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. While we find that the changes of the net 
purchases for the crisis period and the post-crisis period are statistically significant with 
respect to developed countries, they are not statistically significant with respect to the 
emerging countries (see Table 5). Nevertheless, the findings provide evidence that the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers has caused an overall reduction in the holdings of U.S. 
corporate stocks, though the evidence is not statistically significant for emerging markets. 
In line with the findings for government bonds and corporate bonds, we also find that the 
volatility increased during the crisis period. 
 
5.2.2 Pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis average monthly purchases and net purchases of 
foreign long-term securities by U.S. 
Foreign Bonds  
In line with the findings for U.S. long-term securities, Figure 11 shows that the overall 
purchases of foreign bonds (panel A, column 1) increases during the financial crisis 
period. The finding holds for our whole sample, as well as the sample of developed and 
emerging countries and does not change if we exclude the UK or the Cayman Islands 
(panel C). For the post-crisis period, we find that the overall purchases of foreign bond 
continued to increase. Excluding the UK from our sample of developed countries (panel 
C, column 2), however, reduces the dollar amount of foreign bonds purchased by U.S. 
investors for the post-crisis period, though the amount is higher in comparison to the pre-
crisis period.  
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Focusing on the net purchases of foreign bonds by the U.S. (panel B) shows an 
increase during the crisis period and a decrease in the post-crisis period (to levels close to 
the pre-crisis period) for the overall sample (column 1) as well as our sample of 
developed countries (column 3). For the emerging market countries, we find increasing 
negative amounts (panel B, column 3). Excluding the Cayman Islands (panel D, column 
3) provides a substantial negative amount of net purchased foreign bonds for the crisis 
period and a smaller negative amount for the post-crisis period. Table 6 indicates that 
most of the changes with respect to foreign bonds bought by U.S investors are 
statistically significant. On the other hand, the changes are not statistically significant 
with respect to the net purchases of foreign bonds. Finally, Table 6 shows that the 
volatility of foreign bonds purchased by U.S. increased with the financial crisis and 
remained at high levels during the post-crisis levels.  
In summary, the findings show a statistically significant increase in the dollar 
amount of foreign bonds bought by U.S. investors from developed and emerging 
countries during and after the financial crisis. While the increase in the demand of bonds 
from emerging markets seems to support the claim made by developing countries’ 
policymakers that the accommodative monetary policies of the U.S. have caused a 
considerable increase in capital inflow towards emerging countries, the net purchases of 
foreign bonds does not support their claim. 
Foreign Stocks 
Figure 12 shows the results with respect to foreign stocks bought by U.S. 
investors and illustrates that they are almost identical to the patterns found for U.S. 
corporate stocks bought by foreign investors. Panel A shows an increase in the purchases 
of foreign stocks during the financial crisis, but a decrease in the post-crisis period. Yet, 
the levels in the post-crisis period are higher than the levels in the pre-crisis period. The 
changes over the different sub-periods are all statistically significant (see Table 7). 
Furthermore, the results hold for our whole sample (column 1), the sample of developed 
countries (column 2), as well as our sample of emerging market countries (column 3) and 
do not change if we exclude the UK and the Cayman Islands (panel C).  
 Looking at the net purchases of foreign stocks by U.S. investors provides again a 
different picture. For developed countries (panels B and D, column 2), we find for the 
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crisis period a statistically significant decrease for the net demand of corporate stocks, 
with a statistically significant rebound during the post-crisis period (see Table 7). Panel 
D, column 3, provides similar results for our sample of emerging market countries 
(excluding the Cayman Islands), though the findings are not statistically significant (see 
Table 7, panel B). Again, our findings with respect to foreign equity do not seem to 
support the claim that the monetary policies of the U.S. have caused disruptive capital 
flows towards developing countries. While the dollar amount of foreign stocks bought by 
U.S. investors is statistically significantly higher during the post-crisis period in 
comparison to the pre-crisis period, the amount is statistically significantly lower than 
during the crisis-period. Hence, the amount of foreign equity purchased has rather 
decreased with the start of the U.S. quantitative easing. Moreover, while the net 
purchases of foreign equity has increased in the pre-crisis period, the increase is not 
statistically significant and only slightly higher than in the pre-crisis period, especially in 
the case where we exclude the Cayman Islands (panel D, column 3).  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the impact of the global financial crisis on the amount of 
cross-border security flows (measured in U.S. dollars) from and towards the U.S. The 
securities investigated are the U.S. treasury securities, U.S. government bonds, U.S. 
corporate bonds, U.S. corporate stocks, foreign bonds and foreign stocks.  
Plotting line-charts, we investigate the direct impact of the financial crisis on the 
cross-border security flows. Moreover, we divide our sample into three sub-periods: a 
pre-crisis period from 2003 to 2006, a crisis period from 2007 to 2009, and a post-crisis 
period from 2010 to 2013. This allows us to detect if there are statistically significant 
differences in the average monthly amounts between the different sub-periods. Moreover, 
it allows us to analyze the impact of the unprecedented monetary policies by the U.S. that 
follow the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on the cross-border capital flows. This may be 
of special interest as some of the policymakers in developed countries have claimed that 
the accommodative monetary policies by the U.S. have caused disruptive capital flows 
towards their countries.  
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While we find that the global financial crisis has impacted all cross-border capital 
flows in our analysis, the timing, the significance, and the nature of the impact differs 
among the different securities, as well as our sample of developed and emerging market 
countries. We find a significant increase in the demand for U.S. treasuries with the start 
of the global financial crisis in early 2007. The increase holds for the developed and 
emerging markets alike; we interpret the increase as evidence for the commonly stated 
flight-to-safety.  Interestingly, the flight-to-safety experienced a significant, but short 
lived interruption due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Yet, the demand for U.S. 
treasury securities resumed with the beginning of 2009, especially with respect to 
developed countries; while developing countries took much longer to regain trust in U.S. 
treasury securities. Notably, U.S. government bonds, U.S. corporate bonds as well 
foreign bonds experienced a decline in their demand much earlier than U.S. treasuries. In 
line with U.S. treasuries, we find for U.S. stocks and foreign stocks also a significant 
drop in demand with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. However, while the demand 
for U.S. treasuries increased after the financial crisis, we find that the demand has not 
recovered for U.S. corporate bonds, U.S. stocks as well as foreign stocks. The finding is 
similar for developed and emerging countries. It may be seen as evidence that financial 
crisis has caused a general reduction of international cross-border capital flows, 
especially with respect to equity and U.S. corporate bonds, plausibly brought about by a 
general increase in risk aversion. One of the main exceptions to our findings is the 
demand for foreign bonds by U.S. investors, which has substantially increased during the 
period following the financial crisis. This increase is especially significant for the 
demand of foreign bonds from emerging markets. Further, our findings suggest that the 
impact of the global financial crisis on the cross border capital flows was less severe with 
respect to our sample of emerging markets. 
Notably, our results do not indicate much evidence that the accommodative 
monetary policies by the U.S. have caused overall disruptive capital flows towards 
emerging market countries. In fact, we see lower equity flows towards emerging markets 
in the post-crisis; yet, the demand by U.S. investors for bonds from emerging markets 
increased significantly. The latter finding, however, may be more related to the higher 
interest rates in emerging markets in the post-crisis period, rather than higher liquidity 
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brought about by the quantitative easing. The finding points in the direction that U.S. 
investors use foreign bonds as a substitute for more risky (perceived) foreign equity 
investments, possibly due to a general increase in risk-aversion after the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers.  
Finally, we find higher volatility during the crisis period with respect to the 
demand of all long-term securities investigated in this paper. The higher volatility 
subsided for most long-term securities during the post-crisis period.  
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Panel A: U.S. Treasury securities including the Cayman Island and the UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: U.S. Treasury securities excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Purchase and net purchase of U.S. Treasuries by developed and developing countries 
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Panel A: U.S. government bonds including the Cayman Island and the UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: U.S. government bonds excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Purchase and net purchase of U.S. government bonds by developed and developing countries 
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Panel A: U.S. corporate bonds including the Cayman Island and the UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: U.S. corporate bonds excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Purchase and net purchase of U.S. corporate bonds by developed and developing countries 
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Panel A: U.S. corporate stocks including the Cayman Island and the UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: U.S. corporate stocks excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Purchase and net purchase of U.S. corporate stocks by developed and developing countries 
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Panel A: Foreign bonds including the Cayman Island and the UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Foreign bonds excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Purchase and net purchase of foreign bonds of developed and developing countries by U.S. 
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Panel A: Foreign stocks including the Cayman Island and the UK  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Foreign stocks excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Purchase and net purchase of foreign stocks of developed and developing countries by U.S. 
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Panel A: Treasury securities bought 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Treasury securities net purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Treasury securities bought excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Treasury securities net purchase excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Treasury Securities, Average Monthly Demand, 2003 to 2013, 2003 to 2006, 2007 to 2009, 2010 to 2013 
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Panel A: Government securities bought 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Government securities net purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Government securities bought excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Government securities net purchase excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Government Securities, Average Monthly Demand, 2003 to 2013, 2003 to 2006, 2007 to 2009, 2010 to 2013 
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Panel A: Corporate bonds bought 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Corporate bonds net purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Corporate bonds bought excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Corporate bonds net purchase excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Corporate Bonds, Average Monthly Demand, 2003 to 2013, 2003 to 2006, 2007 to 2009, 2010 to 2013 
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Panel A: Corporate stocks bought 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Corporate stocks net purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Corporate stocks bought excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Corporate stocks net purchase excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Corporate stocks, Average Monthly Demand, 2003 to 2013, 2003 to 2006, 2007 to 2009, 2010 to 2013 
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Panel A: Foreign bonds bought 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Foreign bonds net purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Foreign bonds bought excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Foreign bonds net purchase excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Foreign Bonds, Average Monthly Demand, 2003 to 2013, 2003 to 2006, 2007 to 2009, 2010 to 2013 
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Panel A: Foreign stocks bought 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Foreign stocks net purchase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Foreign stocks bought excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Foreign stocks net purchase excluding the Cayman Island and the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Foreign stocks, Average Monthly Demand, 2003 to 2013, 2003 to 2006, 2007 to 2009, 2010 to 2013 
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Table 1: Sample Percentages  
Panel A: Comparison of securities bought between whole sample and grand total   
  2003 - 2013 2003 - 2006 2007 - 2009 
2010 - 
2013 
Treasuries 99% 98% 99% 99% 
Government Bonds 97% 97% 98% 96% 
Corporate Bonds 98% 97% 99% 99% 
Corporate Stocks 93% 90% 96% 91% 
Foreign Bonds 99% 98% 99% 99% 
Foreign Stocks 98% 96% 99% 97% 
Panel B: Percent of securities of the whole sample bought by UK and Cayman 
Islands    
  2003 - 2013 2003 - 2006 2007 - 2009 
2010 - 
2013 
Treasuries 57% 55% 60% 56% 
Government Bonds 47% 48% 55% 37% 
Corporate Bonds 64% 65% 68% 59% 
Corporate Stocks 55% 56% 55% 54% 
Foreign Bonds 53% 56% 40% 57% 
Foreign Stocks 51% 49% 52% 50% 
Panel C: Percent of securities of the whole sample bought by UK      
  2003 - 2013 2003 - 2006 2007 - 2009 
2010 - 
2013 
Treasuries 44% 43% 49% 41% 
Government Bonds 19% 17% 21% 19% 
Corporate Bonds 42% 45% 46% 35% 
Corporate Stocks 19% 24% 16% 18% 
Foreign Bonds 34% 46% 31% 31% 
Foreign Stocks 34% 37% 33% 33% 
Panel D: Percent of securities of whole sample bought by Cayman Islands   
  2003 - 2013 2003 - 2006 2007 - 2009 
2010 - 
2013 
Treasuries 13% 12% 11% 15% 
Government Bonds 28% 31% 33% 18% 
Corporate Bonds 22% 21% 22% 24% 
Corporate Stocks 36% 33% 39% 36% 
Foreign Bonds 19% 10% 10% 27% 
Foreign Stocks 17% 12% 19% 18% 
Panel E: Percent of securities of developed countries bought by 
UK      
  2003 - 2013 2003 - 2006 2007 - 2009 
2010 - 
2013 
Treasuries 56% 57% 62% 53% 
Government Bonds 37% 42% 34% 38% 
Corporate Bonds 67% 71% 56% 65% 
Corporate Stocks 40% 48% 36% 39% 
Foreign Bonds 49% 58% 38% 52% 
Foreign Stocks 56% 50% 59% 55% 
Panel F: Percent of securities of emerging countries bought by Cayman Islands    
  2003 - 2013 2003 - 2006 2007 - 2009 2010 - 
39 
 
2013 
Treasuries 58% 48% 54% 66% 
Government Bonds 57% 58% 68% 42% 
Corporate Bonds 63% 62% 64% 63% 
Corporate Stocks 68% 64% 71% 68% 
Foreign Bonds 60% 50% 48% 65% 
Foreign Stocks 56% 50% 59% 55% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Treasury Securities 
Panel A: Treasuries including the UK and the Cayman Islands 
 
  Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  1092266 28157 847618 22683 244648 5474 
 
STD 338961 27997 273809 23507 85024 13891 
              2010-2013 Mean  1373937 33132 1069299 30206 304638 2926 
 
STD 236740 34667 184288 28528 90103 16455 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 20% 19% 18% 56% 31% -66% 
              2007-2009 Mean  1140852 27936 907577 19414 233275 8523 
 
STD 283282 30461 232443 25123 67238 13671 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 47% 20% 56% 10% 21% 52% 
              2003-2007 Mean  774155 23348 580967 17612 193188 5736 
 
STD 135093 15590 95964 12806 46744 10679 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 4.10 
**
* .72 
 
3.56 
**
* 1.80 ** 3.99 
**
* 
-
1.66 * 
09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 7.18 
**
* 0.83 
 
7.94 
**
* 0.39 
 
3.22 
**
* 1.05 
 13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 
15.2
5 
**
* 1.78 * 
15.2
5 
**
* 2.79 
**
* 7.61 
**
* 
-
0.99   
Panel B: Treasuries excluding the UK and the Cayman Islands 
    Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  472370 17182 369220 10832 103150 6350 
 
STD 140650 20593 132516 17256 22920 13037 
              2010-2013 Mean  608489 21998 506010 16484 102479 5514 
 
STD 106707 22273 95161 18603 21625 16306 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 35% 96% 47% 354% -4% -27% 
              
40 
 
2007-2009 Mean  451391 11205 344685 3630 106707 7575 
 
STD 99815 24598 80387 18828 27527 13373 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 28% -33% 37% -66% 5% 21% 
              2003-2006 Mean  351985 16848 250831 10582 1011154 6266 
 
STD 47664 13568 34538 12146 20448 8533 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 6.86 
**
* 2.10 
*
* 8.21 
**
* 3.12 
**
* 
-
0.79 
 
-
0.62 ` 
09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 5.52 
**
* 
-
1.24 
 
6.57 
**
* 
-
1.93 * 1.06 
 
0.55 
 13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 
15.2
1 
**
* 1.37 
 
17.4
6 
**
* 1.84 * 0.31   
-
0.28   
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The results are based on a two-sample t-test in combination with a Levene-Test of equal 
variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Government Bonds 
Panel A: Government Bonds including the UK and the Cayman Islands 
 
  Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  118940 10711 61298 6500 57641 4211 
 
STD 45020 13847 19517 8738 31136 9110 
              2010-2013 Mean  103141 7907 58902 3413 44240 4494 
 
STD 20835 10344 11068 7185 13268 7082 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 -33% 51% -25% -38% -42% -1703% 
              2007-2009 Mean  154812 5253 78718 5533 76093 -280 
 
STD 65097 19809 23141 11615 44867 13218 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 44% -70% 55% -46% 33% -104% 
              2003-2007 Mean  107835 17608 50630 10313 57204 7295 
 
STD 26322 7468 13636 5950 24137 5077 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 
-
4.59 
**
* 0.73 
 
-
4.75 
**
* 
-
0.97 
 
-
4.13 
**
* 1.97 ** 
09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 4.09 
**
* 
-
3.56 
**
* 6.49 
**
* 
-
2.26 ** 2.29 ** 
-
3.62 
**
* 
13/10 - t-test -   -
**
* 3.26 
**
* -
**
* -
**
* - ** 
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06/03 0.97 5.27 5.12 3.26 2.23 
Panel B: Government Bonds excluding the UK and the Cayman Islands 
    Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  62994 7378 38252 3530 24742 3849 
 
STD 17483 9763 10691 6181 10573 6523 
              2010-2013 Mean  64709 5940 38865 2075 25844 3866 
 
STD 16022 7746 8334 5920 10902 6907 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 -8% 139% -15% 98% 6% 169% 
              2007-2009 Mean  70387 2482 45953 1047 24434 1435 
 
STD 22032 13057 11577 6297 11496 8521 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 26% -80% 44% -85% 2% -75% 
              2003-2007 Mean  55734 12489 31864 6847 23870 5642 
 
STD 11623 5615 7864 4875 9602 3014 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 
-
1.31 
 
1.41 
 
-
3.12 
**
* 0.77 
 
0.57 
 
1.44 ` 
09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 3.63 
**
* 
-
4.31 
**
* 6.29 
**
* 
-
4.76 
**
* 0.24 
 
-
2.83 
**
* 
13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 
-
3.14 
**
* 
-
4.74 ** 4.23 
**
* 
-
4.31 
**
* 0.94   
-
1.63   
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The results are based on a two-sample t-test in combination with a Levene-Test of equal 
variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Corporate Bonds 
Panel A: Corporate Stocks including the UK and the Cayman Islands 
 
  Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  100113 13698 65154 8797 34959 4900 
 
STD 32291 20195 23387 15779 10901 5602 
              2010-2013 Mean  77760 -1206 48504 -3027 29256 1821 
 
STD 14569 8814 10852 7294 5478 2593 
 
%Δ form -38% -110% -41% -138% -33% -57% 
42 
 
09/07 
              2007-2009 Mean  125699 12233 82241 7996 43457 4238 
 
STD 36136 23826 25647 17944 13448 7769 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 22% -59% 19% -62% 27% -50% 
              2003-2007 Mean  103276 29699 68988 21222 34288 8477 
 
STD 26452 12095 19877 10002 8807 3566 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 
-
7.52 
**
* 
-
3.22 
**
* 
-
7.41 
**
* 
-
3.48 
**
* 
-
5.98 
**
* 
-
1.79 * 
09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 3.14 
**
* 
-
4.03 
**
* 2.57 
**
* 
-
3.98 
**
* 3.56 
**
* 
-
3.04 
**
* 
13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 
-
5.85 
**
* 
-
14.3 
**
* 
-
6.27 
**
* 
-
13.6 
**
* 
-
3.36 
**
* 
-
10.5 
**
* 
Panel B: Corporate Stocks excluding the UK and the Cayman Islands 
    Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  35607 5271 22709 2459 12898 2812 
 
STD 9104 8675 6260 6381 3941 2897 
              2010-2013 Mean  32182 -1520 21308 -2421 10874 901 
 
STD 5460 4074 4221 3638 2687 1003 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 -19% -135% -12% -246% -30% -66% 
              2007-2009 Mean  39820 4301 24189 1654 15630 2647 
 
STD 11918 9535 8034 6476 4844 3877 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 11% -66% 5% -79% 21% -45% 
              2003-2007 Mean  35874 12790 23000 7942 12874 4848 
 
STD 8354 4459 6289 3676 2948 1791 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 
-
3.57 
**
* 
-
3.44 
**
* 
-
1.96 ** 
-
3.39 
**
* 
-
5.31 
**
* 
-
2.64 
**
* 
09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 1.70 * 
-
4.95 
**
* 0.74 
 
-
5.23 
**
* 3.02 
**
* 
-
3.16 
**
* 
13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 
-
2.56 
**
* 
-
16.4 
**
* 
-
1.55 
**
* 
-
13.9 
**
* 
-
3.48 
**
* 
-
13.3 
**
* 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The results are based on a two-sample t-test in combination with a Levene-Test of equal 
variance. 
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Table 5: Corporate Stocks 
Panel A: Corporate Stocks including the UK and the Cayman Islands 
 
  Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  544775 6289 255313 4842 289463 1446 
 
STD 229263 11513 96858 8926 136832 5596 
              2010-2013 Mean  563077 3921 265578 2177 297499 1744 
 
STD 64332 11338 28814 9604 40925 4595 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 -28% -62% -25% -74% -30% -4% 
              2007-2009 Mean  781392 10238 353355 8420 428037 1817 
 
STD 245471 14133 111968 9394 140467 8716 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 124% 80% 106% 75% 141% 109% 
              2003-2007 Mean  349011 5694 171515 4824 177496 870 
 
STD 122989 8610 36615 6861 90773 3012 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 
-
5.20 
**
* 
-
2.27 
*
* 
-
4.59 
**
* 
-
2.98 
**
* 
-
5.41 
**
* 
-
0.05 
 09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 9.70 
**
* 1.71 * 9.38 
**
* 2.03 ** 9.34 
**
* 0.63 
 13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 
10.6
9 
**
* 
-
0.86   
13.9
9 
**
* 
-
1.55   8.35 
**
* 1.10   
Panel B: Corporate Stocks excluding the UK and the Cayman Islands 
    Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  244721 2987 152532 2469 92190 518 
 
STD 100140 7371 68659 6591 35955 2474 
              2010-2013 Mean  258204 1370 161719 765 96486 605 
 
STD 26649 8485 17255 7467 13095 2485 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 -26% -75% -28% -84% -22% -20% 
              2007-2009 Mean  349820 5451 225389 4697 124431 753 
 
STD 102845 8367 75105 7444 35060 3452 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 130% 98% 154% 88% 95% 195% 
              2003-2007 Mean  152414 2757 88702 2502 63712 255 
 
STD 44893 4462 18113 4158 29549 1376 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 
-
5.22 
**
* 
-
2.19 
*
* 
-
4.99 
**
* 
-
2.39 
**
* 
-
4.55 
**
* 
-
0.23 
 09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 10.8 
**
* 1.75 * 10.7 
**
* 1.59 
 
8.39 
**
* 0.82 
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13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 14.0 
**
* 
-
1.00   20.2 
**
* 
-
1.41   7.03 
**
* 0.85   
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The results are based on a two-sample t-test in combination with a Levene-Test of equal 
variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Foreign Bonds 
Panel A: Foreign Bonds including the UK and the Cayman Islands 
 
  Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  220436 5197 152302 5811 68134 -614 
 
STD 95078 12187 54752 11797 52148 4500 
              2010-2013 Mean  320995 4670 190320 5810 130675 -1140 
 
STD 56779 13327 43159 12694 29991 5051 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 57% -34% 17% -25% 217% -80% 
              2007-2009 Mean  203834 7074 162654 7707 41180 -634 
 
STD 61057 14206 56112 13536 18376 5746 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 54% 64% 53% 76% 60% 754% 
              2003-2007 Mean  132329 4317 106520 4391 25809 -74 
 
STD 27016 9073 21201 9246 6942 2402 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 9.06 
**
* 
-
0.80 
 
2.46 ** 
-
0.66 
 
16.8
8 
**
* 
-
0.43 
 09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 6.56 
**
* 1.02 
 
5.71 
**
* 1.27 
 
4.77 
**
* 
-
0.55 
 13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 
20.7
9 
**
* 0.15   
12.0
7 
**
* 0.63   
23.6
0 
**
* 
-
1.32   
Panel B: Foreign Bonds excluding the UK and the Cayman Islands 
    Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  104254 8422 77258 8644 26996 -222 
 
STD 49711 18742 40070 18252 16310 3650 
              2010-2013 Mean  137369 7999 92131 8140 45239 -141 
 
STD 28353 21129 22039 20270 10207 4297 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 13% -14% -8% -18% 111% -79% 
              
45 
 
2007-2009 Mean  121873 9306 100411 9986 21462 -680 
 
STD 52184 19599 50324 19149 8998 4536 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 110% 14% 123% 23% 66% -1799% 
              2003-2007 Mean  57924 8183 45020 8143 12904 40 
 
STD 22497 15674 20139 15578 3290 1763 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 1.61 * 
-
0.29 
 
-
0.92 
 
-
0.42 
 
11.1
1 
**
* 
-
0.56 ` 
09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 6.89 
**
* 0.29 
 
6.24 
**
* 0.49 
 
5.44 
**
* 
-
0.90 
 13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 
15.2
1 
**
* 
-
0.05   
10.9
3 
**
* 0.00   
20.8
9 
**
* 
-
0.27   
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The results are based on a two-sample t-test in combination with a Levene-Test of equal 
variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Foreign Stocks 
Panel A: Foreign Stocks including the UK and the Cayman Islands 
 
  Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  284258 6873 197608 4925 86651 1948 
 
STD 111000 8307 68890 8661 43100 4257 
              2010-2013 Mean  308173 7460 209776 4821 98397 2640 
 
STD 34565 7790 23721 8502 12426 3957 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 -20% 102% -19% 205% -22% 26% 
              2007-2009 Mean  383819 3686 258137 1583 125681 2103 
 
STD 108760 10664 69931 11131 40029 5963 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 107% -58% 84% -79% 175% 85% 
              2003-2007 Mean  185673 8675 140042 7536 45631 1139 
 
STD 78966 5958 51783 5388 28353 2684 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 
-
4.02 
**
* 1.88 * 
-
3.98 
**
* 1.51 
 
-
3.95 
**
* 0.50 
 09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 9.25 
**
* 
-
2.53 ** 8.53 
**
* 
-
2.96 
**
* 
10.2
3 
**
* 0.90 
 13/10 - t-test 9.85 ** -   8.48 ** - * 11.8 ** 2.18 *
46 
 
06/03 * 0.86 * 1.87 1 * * 
Panel B: Foreign Stocks excluding the UK and the Cayman Islands 
    Whole Sample Developed Emerging 
    Bought Net Bought Net Bought Net 
2003-2013 Mean  139751 4162 101481 2315 38270 1847 
 
STD 51334 6529 35466 5361 16442 2794 
              2010-2013 Mean  153008 4738 108931 2549 44077 2188 
 
STD 18875 5227 14416 4760 5698 2669 
 
%Δ form 
09/07 -17% 1150% -18% 359% -14% 60% 
              2007-2009 Mean  183366 379 132325 -985 51041 1364 
 
STD 46659 7905 32466 6318 14670 3102 
 
%Δ form 
06/03 96% -94% 87% -122% 123% -27% 
              2003-2007 Mean  93783 6424 70898 4556 22884 1868 
 
STD 39658 5332 27794 3769 12634 2679 
              13/10 - 
09/07   t-test 
-
3.68 
**
* 3.04 
**
* 
-
4.04 
**
* 2.93 
**
* 
-
2.70 
**
* 1.31 ` 
09/07 - 
06/03    t-test 9.95 
**
* 
-
4.18 
**
* 9.33 
**
* 
-
4.68 
**
* 9.43 
**
* 
-
0.80 
 13/10 - 
06/03 t-test 9.43 
**
* 
-
1.56   8.42 
**
* 
-
2.29 ** 
10.5
9 
**
* 0.59   
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The results are based on a two-sample t-test in combination with a Levene-Test of equal 
variance. 
 
 
 
